The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), known as Sepah, is a 130,000-strong army that was created after the 1979 revolution. Sepah operates in addition to Iran’s regular army, which defends the country’s borders and constitution. In contrast, Sepah’s primary mandate is to protect and defend the values of the Islamic Revolution and Iran’s Islamic system of governance. Since its inception, its responsibilities and powers have continually expanded, eventually running significant portions of Iran’s industries, such as construction, oil and gas, and most importantly, its nuclear program.

Sepah’s activities expanded in the 1990’s to include media ownership and content production, and in recent years, Sepah has become an aggressive player in the Iranian media market. This foray into media production and ownership has become an important mechanism in Sepah’s institutional quest to dispel opposition, control media content, and advocate for traditional values. IMP and ASL19 outline the four phases of Sepah’s expansion into media activities, beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution and continuing to present day.

1. Sepah’s incipient media activity

The period between 1979 and 1990 marked Sepah’s incipient media activity. This was characterized by subtle and informal media activities that were mainly directed internally to Sepah members, updating them on current events and leadership opinions and positions on certain matters. A daily “News and Analysis” bulletin was published by the Political Office of the Supreme Leader’s Representative in Sepah and the official news from Sepah and Basij (the volunteer paramilitary group that Sepah controls) was distributed through state media outlets such as Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and newspapers such as Kayhan.

2. Sepah’s active engagement with published media

The years between the early 1990s and 2002 mark the beginning of Sepah’s more active engagement within the media, particularly print media. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei initiated a formal media role for the organization by appointing senior Sepah member Hossein Shariatmadari as his representative to the Kayhan Institute, a large and influential publishing group, and as the managing editor of its hard-liner daily newspaper Kayhan. He later appointed Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi, the former head of Sepah’s Office of Political Affairs, editor of Kayhan. The conservative and powerful newspaper Kayhan has been under the supervision of senior Sepah members for the past two decades.

Sepah’s media interests collided with the 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as president, which was marked by the emergence of numerous reformist newspapers, and increased media dynamism that began attracting the ire of the regime. What began with the closure of the reformist paper Jamme led to the mass banning of dozens of publications in 2000, culminating in a dramatic repression of reformist activities. Sepah was able to exploit this situation by expanding its own activities throughout this period, launching Javan newspaper. After establishing Javan’s online version in 2009, the media organization produced some compelling and surprising content, such as an exposé of hospitals refusing to treat injured Basjis and Sepah- affiliated militias, perhaps unorthodox for a publication well-known for being associated with Sepah.

3. Sepah’s foray into online media activities

The years between 2000 and 2009 mark Sepah’s entrance into online media with the launch of the news website Baztab. Baztab was run by a number of former Sepah members who were close to former Sepah commander Mohsen Rezaei. Baztab’s editorial line closely mirrored Sepah’s institutional mandate, especially with respect to their stance against opposition groups living abroad and reformists inside Iran.

Surprisingly, Sepah did not support Mohsen Rezaei and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s candidacy during the 2005 elections, even though both individuals were senior Sepah commanders who had supported Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s career when he was within Sepah’s lower ranks, revealing the organization’s internal divisions, and triggering a divergence inhttp://web.archive.org/web/20090215181948/http:/baztab.com/news/75484.php ">Baztab’s editorials. Baztab would be later filtered, and eventually completely shut down in 2007 after publishing editorials critical of the Ahmadinejad administration. Foad Sadeghi, a member of Baztab’s policy board went on to say, "the government is acting as complainant, prosecutor, judge and executioner. The order violates eight principles of the constitution and restricts the media's freedom of expression, which does not serve the people in the current sensitive situation."

A faction within Baztab who had maintained closer ties to Sepah established the Tabnak website, while the other more critical faction established the Ayandeh News website. Ayandeh News was subsequently banned, its editor arrested, and it later reestablished itself as Baztab Emrooz.

As a countermeasure to IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency), which was at the time headed by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami and the reform-minded ILNA, Sepah established its most influential outlet with Fars News Agency in 2000. While its agenda was set by a “weekly policy council” consisting of a group of senior Sepah commanders, Fars initially concealed its association with the organization.

Sepah’s Office of Political Affairs is a key player in the organization’s policy formation and is under the supervision of the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. In 1999, the Political Affairs office established a network called Hadian Siasi, translated as “political guides,” which is a large network of Sepah personnel tasked with boosting the moral of the organization. They subsequently launched news website called Basirat, which reports news and analysis about matters internal to Sepah and the Basij, and together, the network and website function to reinforce religious beliefs political insights within Sepah. Contrastingly, Fars developed into Sepah’s external public media outlet.

4. Media dominance, internal divisions, and external challenges

The post-election protests in 2009 and the emergence of the “Green Movement” created political divisions in Iran which have been reflected within Sepah as it increasingly faces its own unique set of challenges as a military-security and political-economic empire. Additionally, the political unrest of 2009, increased sanctions, and the reverberations of the Arab Spring, have had a ripple effect on its media operations and brought about internal divisions within Sepah. While struggling to extinguish the opposition movement and enforcing crackdowns on reformists and activists, there has also been an ongoing battle against Ahmadinejad and his team who have been supported by only a minor faction within Sepah.

Some, like founder of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Hossein Alayee and the head of Sepah’s Joint Chiefs of Staff have vocally condemned Sepah’s ruling elite for executions, shootings, and crackdowns against post-election protesters. Other Sepah commanders, like Sadeq Mahsuli and Abdolali Najafi, have supported Ahmadinejad throughout the violent post-election period, and his subsequent hardliner policies. Others however, like head of Sepah’s Intelligence Bureau Hassan Taeb, remain rigidly in alliance with the Supreme Leader’s policies and positions. Accordingly, these factions have begun establishing news websites and agencies reflective of their various political stances.

           4.1 Factionalization of Sepah-affiliated online media

Sepah-affiliated media can be divided into two groups, with the first group acting as the official news websites for the various divisions within Sepah and the Basij. Sepah News, for example,is the official website of the Center for Information and Electronic Publishing of Sepah’s Office of Public Relations and Publishing, and headed by senior Sepah commander Ramezan Sharif. Another example of a Sepah news source is Hamaseh, which is the news website of the Office of Public Relations. While Sepah News publishes current stories related to the IRGC, Hamaseh manages an archive of stories and issues related to the organization.

The vast majority of the provincial branches of Sepah also have their own news websites, such as Tehran’s Provincial website and the Ashura Sepah Army website, which belongs to Azarbaijan Sharghi province. Each of these provincial news sites produces content mainly centered on the major headlines and local news related to Sepah and the Basij.

The second group of Sepah related online media includes dozens of websites that are not officially affiliated with an agency or division within Sepah, but function as part of Sepah’s media initiatives and the below list includes the key news agencies and websites that constitute Sepah’s media activities:

· Fars News, affiliated with Sepah
· Basirat, affiliated with the Sepah’s Office of Political Affairs
· Sepah News, affiliated with the Center for Information and Electronic Publishing at Sepah’s Office of Public Relations and Publishing
· Neday-e Enghelab, affiliated with Sepah’s Office of Political Affairs
· Farhang-e Enghelabe Eslami, affiliated with the Office of Cultural and Social Affairs
· Fater News, affiliated with the deputy commander of the Office of Cultural and Social Affairs
· Mashregh News, affiliated with Sepah’s Intelligence Bureau
· Bultan News, affiliated with the Intelligence Bureau
· Dideb?n, affiliated with the Intelligence Bureau
· Javan Online, affiliated the Intelligence Bureau
· Ammarion, affiliated with the Intelligence Bureau
· Basij Press, affiliated with the Commander in Chief of the Basij
· Khabar Daneshjo, affiliated with the Student Basij
· Tasnim, affiliated with the Intelligence Bureau of Sepah and close to the Quds Force

             4.2 Sepah’s media administration and media companies

Since 2009, Sepah’s Intelligence Bureau chief has been Hossein Taeb, who has worn many different hats within the Iranian military apparatus, including acting as a trusted clerical ally to the Supreme leader and Cultural Commander of Imam Hossein University (a military university that belongs to Sepah) as well as acting commander of the Basij during the 2009 protests. In his capacity, Taeb chooses the directors of the various Sepah-affiliated media organs from the pool of prominent security figures within the organization. http://www.tasnimnews.com ">Tasnim News Agency, established in November 2012, is led by Hossein Gholizadeh, the previous vice president of Fars News Agency, who stated that the impetus behind Tasnim’s (Guarantee) creation was to “form a solid front against the media dominance of our enemies.” Tasnim’s editorial line takes care to frame the recent revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa as a popular demand for Iranian-modeled Islamic government, minimizing the uprisings as the result of dissatisfaction with dictatorial regimes and poor economic conditions.

Sepah has established several media production companies, each running a number of websites and news agencies. For example, Atlas Media Corporation has a set of more than ten subsidiary websites, which include Borhan, Nasim Online, Majlis-e Nohom, Afsarane Javan-e Jang-e Narm,Eshragh, Moj-e Ghanon, Behdokht, Didar Media, Iran Haste-ee, Safir.

Hamid Reza Moghadam, head of Fars News Agency from 2007 to 2011 and Sepah’s current deputy of Cultural Affairs, has described the extensive media activities of Sepah as an “aggressive” approach against opposition that whose success depends on continued aggression. However, Deputy Commander of Iran’s Semnan province Alireza Rajabi has expressed his concern over the growing antagonism against Sepah, as well as extensive internal divisions between members of Sepah and the Basij, which he attributes to the expansion of Sepah’s media activities over the past three years and the conflicting goals of trying to increase audience shares and connect with consumers and citizens while simultaneously attempting to impose a prescriptive set of values and morality and act as a stalwart against the Soft War.

            4.3 Budgeting Sepah’s Media Efforts

Since the budgets of Sepah, the Basij, and other security and military services are considered confidential, the details of their media budget are never disclosed to other sections of the government. Their online media activities are funded by different sections of Sepah, such as the Deputy of Political Affairs, the Deputy of Cultural and Social Affairs, the Intelligence Bureau, and Public Relations and Publishing. According to some informed sources in Iran, these websites are partly funded by the USD$20 billion budget for waging the Soft War.

Prior to the conflict between Ahmadinejad and Sepah, Ahmadinejad provided Sepah with funding and direct orders to support the cultural activities of Quds Force (a special unit within the IRGC tasked with exporting the Islamic revolution). Moreover, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e. the Iranian parliament) has provided the Basij with a proprietary fund for its cultural activities, which includes media.

5. The Future of Sepah’s Media

The upcoming March presidential elections will surely ignite differences endemic to the Sepah media scene, as well as influence the trajectory of Sepah’s media activities and ownership strategies. There are internal rumblings that Khamenei has warned Sepah commanders to wait out Ahmadinejad’s presidency before power and stability can be restored. How Sepah’s media activities end up squaring with Sepah’s official policies as the elections draw near will depend on the candidates who are ultimately selected as viable contenders. As for now, Sepah’s media strategies remain in a holding pattern until the candidates have been vetted and the campaigning begins.

By Iran Media Research

 

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